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   1  
Abstract 
 
How do individuals smooth consumption when they are paid monthly but make consumption 
decisions at least every week within that month? Are consumers credit constrained in the short-
run with respect to non-durable consumption and can we determine the impact of this?  This 
paper examines behaviour of individuals who receive income periodically but make 
consumption decisions on a more frequent basis when they are faced with an imperfect capital 
market with respect to the price and quantity of credit, and with price uncertainty.  We present 
for the first time a dynamic model to characterise optimal behaviour and prove the existence of 
the stationary solution for each ￿micro￿ consumption period within the payment period.  We 
simulate the numerical solution to the model and there is a clear u-shape over the payment 
period.  At a given level of wealth, consumption is highest in the first week after income receipt, 
decreases in the second and third weeks and increases again in the fourth.  A pseudo maximum 
likelihood estimator is applied to data from the Family Expenditure Survey to estimate the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  However there is evidence of substantial measurement 
error in the data and we estimate that this accounts for about 50% of the total variation in the 



















1. Introduction   2  
 
In the recent past a new problem has arisen for consumers with respect to consumption 
decisions.  Currently (1998/99), close to 58% of working persons in the UK receive their 
income on a monthly basis but they make consumption decisions more frequently.  How does 
such an individual choose to allocate their spending over the month?  Do individuals spend the 
same proportion of income in each week or are expenditures significantly higher on receipt of 
their income and then reduced until the next payday?  An additional issue is how this short-run 
consumption decision fits into a life-cycle consumption plan i.e. combining food and other non 
durable consumption with mortgage and other credit repayments and pension plan contributions.  
Prima facia evidence in Figure 1 shows the pattern of non-durable expenditure over the payment 
cycle for nine different income groups and there is a clear pattern.  For most groups 
consumption is relatively high in the first week when income is received, then decreases for the 
second and third and is then relatively high in the fourth week, in anticipation of payment being 
received at the end of that week.  
 
However, does such a pattern reflect optimal behaviour?  Traditional consumption theory 
suggests that consumption should be smooth given that income is known with certainty each 
month.  However, there is still uncertainty with regard to expenditure levels which arises from 
many sources: repairs to household durables, school trips for children, spontaneous purchases, 
and variation in prices.  Intuition suggests that individuals may postpone ￿unnecessary￿ 
consumption until all information is known so that they have resources to deal with any 
unexpected negative shocks during the month: this in effect is the precautionary motive for 
saving widely discussed in the literature (see Carroll and Kimball 2001).  This implies positive 
consumption growth during the month as uncertainty is gradually resolved, particularly between 
the second last and last week of the payment cycle, when all information is known and income 
is received in the next week.  At a given level of wealth, the optimal consumption is likely to be 
different in the second week of the payment cycle than in the fourth week because in the fourth   3  
week all uncertainty is resolved and income is received in the next period whereas in the second 
there are still two weeks of uncertain expenditure remaining.   
 
The pattern shown in Figure 1 is consistent with consumers showing some degree of caution 
during the earlier weeks: although expenditure is high when monthly income is received, there 
is a substantial drop in weeks two and three, but a sharp increase in the final week when 
uncertainty is resolved and income is expected.   
Figure 1 Average Non-durable expenditure by income group over payment cycle 98/99 
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However, an additional factor in the consumption decision may be a limit on unsecured 
borrowing for non-durable consumption for a short period of time.  In this case the outcome will 
differ from when we assume individuals hold liquid assets or have unlimited credit to use as a 
buffer against negative shocks and who therefore have an expenditure pattern which in 
independent of income.  In that case the liquidity constraints will reinforce the cautious 
behaviour of individuals as a response to uncertainty as pointed out in Deaton 1991, page 1222.  
Therefore the decisions on consumption earlier in the payment cycle will take account of the 
fact that there is limited credit with which to finance consumption until income is received again   4  
when positive wealth is exhausted.  This also implies that an individual will not be at their credit 
limit before week four because consumption would then be zero until the start of the next cycle.  
In addition, the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) out of wealth and borrowings will 
differ during the month; early in the month the MPC out of debt should be low, while both 
should increase as the next receipt of income gets closer.  If there is an interest rate differential 
between borrowing and saving, then borrowing will not occur until all positive wealth is 
depleted. 
 
Section 2 of this paper presents some illustrative empirical evidence showing the existence of a 
pattern in expenditure decisions over a payment cycle.  Section 3 presents a simple model of 
simultaneous consumption and income decisions incorporating a limit on borrowing and an 
interest rate differential.  Section 4 describes the extension and solution to this model which 
allows for periodic receipt of income relative to consumption decisions.  Section 5 describes the 
estimation procedure and presents some Monte Carlo results.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Empirical description of Short-Run Consumption decisions 
 
With a given a level of uncertainty and the possibility of liquidity constraints, the consumption 
level consistent with any level of wealth will depend on the point at which the individual is in 
the payment cycle.  However, as already noted above, this is not due to preferences or discount 
rates that vary over time: only the variation in the amount of uncertainty which makes the 
marginal utility of any given level of expenditure a function on the point in the payment cycle at 
which the expenditure occurs.  Thus the point in the payment cycle acts as a shift factor in the 
utility function which is similar to incorporating demographic factors in the long-run 
consumption models.  In the weeks in which there is more uncertainty, the marginal utility of 
consumption for given expenditure is shifted downwards relative to weeks when there is less 
uncertainty and by implication consumption must be lower in the weeks with more uncertainty.    5  
The framework here closely follows Zeldes (1989), using a CRRA utility in order to derive an 
approximation to the Euler equation.   
 
We assume a CRRA utility function of the form  
1












where  ρ  is the coefficient of risk aversion, ct is consumption and z represents the effect of 
different points in the payment cycle.  If there is no limit on the amount of borrowing, then in 
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subject only to a budget constraint governing the evolution of wealth 
     () ( ) 1 1 tt t wr w y c + =+ +− , 
where  β  is the discount rate, y is regular income, r is the interest rate.  The first order 
conditions for this problem leads to an Euler equation which implies that discounted marginal 
utility should be constant between time periods 
1
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where both r and β  are assumed to be constant over time and across households.  The left hand 
side of this equation should differ from one only by the expectation error et+1, which has mean 
zero and is independent of information known at period t including monthly income.  Taking 
logs of both sides and rearranging gives the equation for consumption growth as  
[] 11 1
1
ln( ) ( ) ln(1 ) ln( ) ln(1 ) tt t t cz zr e β
ρ
++ + ∆= − − + − + +  
Given that changes in regular monthly are likely to be known in advance, we assume that the 
level of income is known with certainty.  However significance of income in explaining 
consumption growth would indicate the importance of liquidity constraints because the 
(2.1)   6  
individual cannot simply borrow as necessary to achieve their optimal path and so that path 
cannot be independent of the timing of receipt of income.  The econometric specification of 
(2.1) therefore also includes the level of monthly income and is given by 
,1 ,1 ln ln iw it w w w w iw eyd α γ ε −− ∆= + +     (2.2) 
where    ln iw e ∆  = growth in expenditure in week w, for individual i, 
it y        = level of pay received by individual i at the start of month t,  
,1 ww d −   = dummies for the transition between weeks w, w-1, 
iw ε   = stochastic error term which has mean zero and is iid.   
 
If d represents a dummy variable which takes the value equal to one in w, (dw - dw-1) becomes a 
zero sum dummy over the payment cycle for each individual.  The dummy variables capture the 
effect of moving between weeks and thus their significance indicates the importance of the 
changing level of uncertainty.  We estimate this Euler equation using data from the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) in the UK which records expenditure for two consecutive weeks for 
each individual in the survey, as well as the dates over which expenditure is recorded, and the 
date, amount, and period covered by the last received income.  Thus for all monthly paid 
individuals, the weeks of the payment cycle over which they are observed is clear.  The FES for 
1996/97, 1997/98 and 1998/99 are used but the sample is restricted to those individuals who are 
in full time employment, are usually paid monthly and whose last income receipt is their usual 
income
2.  We separate the sample into individuals who may be constrained with respect to 
short-term credit based on whether they are recorded as holding a credit card in the dataset.  
However this depends on the individual paying an annual charge for their card and therefore we 
supplement this by also recording whether individuals made any purchases on credit during 
their diary period.  While this is not a perfect indicator of liquidity, close to 55% of our sample 
                                                           
2 The estimations exclude ￿outliers￿ which are defined as persons whose non-durable consumption in any 
one week is greater than their monthly income.  These observations (less than 3%) biased the results 
towards the insignificance of income.  Monthly effects are also controlled for but the coefficients are not 
reported.   7  
is classified as unconstrained which seems realistic although conservative.
3  T h i s  m a y  b e  
explained by the fact that we record individuals who did not use their credit card during the 
fortnight or pay an annual charge during the previous year as constrained.   
 
The results of the estimation of equation 2 are presented in Table 1: monthly dummies were 
included although the coefficients are not reported.  The effect of moving between different 
weeks in the payment cycle is measured relative to the effect of going from week four when 
uncertainty is least to week one when it is greatest.  The significant coefficient on d43 for all 
years indicates individuals respond in a positive way to the resolution of all uncertainty.  The 
negative sign on d32 is consistent with the pattern in Figure 1 for the income groups where 
consumption falls throughout the month and increases at the end.  Because uncertainty is less in 
week three than week two, we would expect this coefficient to be positive however, although 
the negative values are insignificant in two ￿ thirds of the results.  The results are also quite 
clear when the sample is split into groups which we consider to be liquidity constrained 
(without a credit card) and those who are not.  Again for all years, the effect of payment cycle is 
significant for the constrained group, while there is no effect on the unconstrained group lending 
weight to the argument that those with access to credit have less need to act in a cautious 
manner.  However these individuals also have higher income we cannot determine whether 
these individuals are dissaving or borrowing.   
 
In 97/98 and 98/99 the level of monthly income is significant for the whole sample even when 
the position in the payment cycle is controlled for.  This points towards the possibility of 
liquidity constraints given that the level of income is certain when consumption decisions are 
made although the coefficient on income is positive which is at odds with the results of virtually 
all previous tests for excess sensitivity (see Table 5.1, Browning and Luscardi, 1996).
4 
                                                           
3 However, following the findings of Japelli et al (1998), this may still provide a more accurate 
classification that wealth to income ratio.   
4 In this short-run framework, higher income relieves short-run liquidity constraints and leads to a higher 








  All  observations Unconstrained Sample    Constrained Sample 
 
  98/99 97/98 96/97  98/99 97/98 96/97  98/99 97/98 96/97 
 
Dependent variable: dlndexp         
N  3225 3169 2688  1750 1762 1342  1475 1407 1346 
 
































































































When the two groups are considered separately however, income is always insignificant for the 
group we consider to be constrained, but this may still be due to misclassification of those 
unconstrained individuals.  More difficult to explain is the significance of income for the 
unconstrained group in 97/98 and 98/99 which is directly at odds with the presence of liquidity 
constraints.  However, income is generally the greatest determinant of access to credit and 
therefore it is possible that we are capturing this relationship here.  In results not reported here, 
we correct for selectivity in credit card ownership by using a Heckman selection estimator and 
in that case, the level of income and the payment cycle are insignificant for the unconstrained 
group.  Also including squared terms of log income, which simply relaxes the assumption that 
expenditure growth is a linear function of log income, also results in insignificant income terms 
for the unconstrained group. 
 
income towards its permanent income level leads to a lower long-run consumption growth rate as the   9  
 
 
3. A Model of Short-Run Consumption  
 
Before looking at the behaviour of agents with periodic income relative to their consumption 
decisions, a simpler model is presented to analyse the case of simultaneous payment and 
consumption decisions, when account is taken of the interest rate differential between 
borrowing and saving evident in capital markets.  We also incorporate an upper bound on the 
level of borrowing given that the amount of unsecured short-term borrowing is very likely to be 
limited for at least some of the population, particularly those with low income.  Uncertainty is 
assumed to arise from variation in prices which also captures the choices individuals can make 
over expenditure when similar products are differentiated with respect to price. Although no 
assumptions regarding preferences are made at this stage, once the marginal utility function is 
not linear, the optimal path of the individual will be changed because expectations are affected 
by uncertainty. 
 
The problem of utility maximisation in this framework is one of dynamic programming with the 
consumer in each period choosing a consumption level which maximises current utility plus 
their preference for future wealth, given constraints and expectations.  Consumption will be 
determined by the real value of wealth which depends on the realisation of current price pt and 
therefore the value function has two state variables, nominal wealth and price.  The realisation 
of future price is denoted by π  and we assume both p and π  are drawn from the distribution F 
with support P over which expectations are taken.  We also assume that price does not exhibit 
any persistence: if this was not the case, the current price level would contain information about 
the price distribution in the next period over which expectations are taken.  The budget 
 
income level stabilizes.  It is this long-run effect that previous studies using panel data have captured.     10  
constraint for each time period t is  tt t t p cwy d ≤+ + , and the evolution of wealth follows the 
process
5:  () 1 (1 ) ( ) tt t t t ww y p cr d r δ + =+ − + + − ,  
where  tt p c  = expenditure on consumption, 
  t w  = wealth, 
  y  = regular income,  
  t d = debt in period t, subject to an upper limit of d , 
  r  = return on savings , 
  δ = cost of borrowing. 
Wealth at the start of each period before income is received is denoted by  t w .  We assume that 
y,  d ,  r and δ  are exogenous and known with certainty and that the differential between 
borrowing and saving rates is constant.     
 
The Bellman equation for this problem is 
  () () ( ) { }
0
,m a x ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ,
pc w d y
dd
Vw p uc E V rw y p c d r βδ π
≤++
≤≤
  = + + + −+−   P    (3.1) 
where the value function V(.), and the felicity function  () uc are assumed to be increasing, 
monotonic and concave. It is assumed that the discount factor β  is such that β (1+δ ) <1 i.e. the 
consumer is ￿impatient￿ and thus has a preference for consumption in the present.  For a given 
wealth and price realisation, the control variable consumption is chosen to maximise the right 
hand side, subject to a lower limit on negative wealth.  The problem fulfils the conditions for 
continuity and differentiability of the value function as laid down by Benveniste and 
Scheinkman (1979) and so the value function in 3.1 will hold for all levels of wealth and price.   
 
The Lagrangean equation for the problem gives 
                                                           
5 It would not be unreasonable to assume that over a sufficiently short period of time, the return on 
savings equals zero.   11  
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The solution to this problem can be characterised by examining different values of the 
multipliers.  Firstly if γ =0, this implies that the agent does not consume all cash in hand, which 
can only occur if the consumer is a ￿saver￿.  In this situation borrowing must be zero
6,  1 µ >0, 
2 µ =0, and there is positive wealth carried over to the next period.  In all other cases γ >0, i.e. 
consumption is greater than or equal to the sum of wealth and income, and assets carried 
between periods and less than or equal to zero.  Obviously  1 µ >0 implies 2 µ =0, and vice versa, 
but  12 0 µµ ==  can occur if the level of optimal borrowing is positive but below the limit.  
Thus, when the individual consumes their cash in hand, γ >0, but has zero borrowing,  1 µ >0, 
consumption exactly equals wealth in that period, and there are no assets or liabilities carried 
between periods.  Then wealth equals income in the next period.  Alternatively, if γ >0 and 
there is some level of positive borrowing, 1 µ = 2 µ =0, consumption is equal to the optimal level 
of debt d*, plus cash on hand and a negative wealth of  () 1* d δ −+  is carried into the next 
period.  The final possibility is when γ >0,  2 µ >0 and 1 µ =0, at which point the individual is at   12  
his credit limit, consuming the maximum amount available and has maximum debt at the start of 
next period  () 1 d δ −+  but consumption is still below the optimal. Therefore we have only four 
possible ￿regimes￿ for the individual 
 
 Regime  1:  * pcw y <+,            * d =0 ,         γ =0,  1 µ >0,  2 µ =0, 
 Regime  2:  * pcw y =+,            * d =0  ,        γ >0,  1 µ >0,  2 µ =0, 
 Regime  3:  ** pcw y d =++ ,   0< * dd < ,  γ  >0,  1 µ  = 2 µ =0, (3.3) 
 Regime  4:  pcwyd =++,      * dd = ,         γ >0, 1 µ =0,  2 µ >0. 
 
3.2   Regime boundaries 
The regime within which (3.1) is maximised depends on the level of optimal consumption 
relative to the real value of wealth and will determine how much borrowing or saving occurs.  
The boundaries between regimes can be identified from the first order conditions, (3.2).   
Following Deaton (1991) denote cash on hand as the sum of wealth and income.  Considering 
first when all cash on hand is consumed, γ >0, but optimal debt is zero so 1 µ >0,  2 µ =0, i.e. 
there is zero wealth carried between periods, so the first order conditions from equation 3.2 are  























.   
Solving for γ gives  
  () () /0 , 1
(1 )








 ,  (3.4) 
because γ  >0 and then substituting this into the expression for  1 µ , leads to   
 
6 A consumer will never borrow and not consume that extra cash when the cost of borrowing is greater 
than the return on savings which rules out γ =0, µ 1 =µ 2=0 and γ =0, µ 1>0 µ 2=0.   13  
  () () /0 , 1
(1 )








Thus, when the marginal utility of real cash on hand falls between the discounted value of 
having no assets or debt in the future and the agent consumes exactly cash on hand.  If the 




, is less than the discounted future 
value of zero savings, i.e. the opposite of 3.4, optimal consumption is below the level of real 
cash on hand and saving occurs, and the consumer is in regime 1.  Similarly, if it is greater than 
the discounted future value of zero borrowing, consumption is financed out of debt in order to 
reach optimal consumption.
7   
 
When the consumer is constrained i.e. consumption is equal to wyd ++, debt is at the upper 
limit,  0 γ > , 2 µ >0,  1 µ =0, so the first order conditions in this case are (from equation 3.2) 
  () () /( 1 ) ,
(1 ) 0





















.   
Again solving for γ  and substituting into  2 µ  gives  
  () () /( 1 ) ,
(1 )




∂+ + ∂− +
>+
∂∂
.   (3.6) 
When this condition holds the real marginal utility of maximum possible consumption is greater 
than the discounted future value of having maximum debt, the consumer uses all available credit 
up to the limit.  In this case, wealth combined with total available credit is below the agents 
optimal consumption, so the credit constraint is binding and if it were possible, marginal utility 
would be further decreased.  However, this is not possible and so consumption remains below 
the optimal.  If the opposite of 3.6 is true but the individual still has a preference for 
consumption greater than cash on hand, then positive borrowing will lower current marginal   14  
utility of consumption and increase the future value of wealth until the two terms equate at 
1 µ = 2 µ =0 when there is some negative wealth carried between periods.  These conditions allow 
the identification of the regime that an individual will fall into, given a price realisation, pt a 
wealth level w, income y , fixed interest rates, discount rate and preferences.  However, the 
effect of price realisation is ambiguous: a low price will increase the value of real wealth, 
decreasing marginal utility but will increase the real value of marginal utility.   
 
These first order conditions and corresponding regimes can be written as an augmented Euler 
equation where  ) c λ ( denotes the marginal utility of consumption, and the conditions relating 






































   
   
  
      
         (3.7) 
with expectations taken with respect to price.  Consider first if the consumer did not have access 
to any credit, then the maximum value that consumption could take would be () / tt wyp +  and 
once 
*









 and the Euler 
equation is fulfilled in an unconstrained way.  When the credit constraint binds, total cash on 
hand  () / tt wyp +  is the highest possible consumption and this gives a lower bound on 




















7 Obviously if r δ = , there are only three regimes and every consumer is either a saver or a borrower.     15  
as shown in Deaton (1991).  With access to credit markets limited to  t d , maximum 
consumption is now () / t tt wy d p ++ .  If 
*
t c  is below the constrained level, () / t tt wy d p ++ , 
marginal utility will be higher than at the maximum possible consumption level.  Hence, the 
individual chooses the maximum available marginal utility either  ()
*










 when constrained.  With the addition of an interest rate 
differential, there may be consumers who have a wealth level and preferences such that optimal 
consumption is exactly cash in hand because they are not ￿impatient￿ enough to borrow, or 
￿patient￿ enough to save. i.e. both equation 3.4 and 3.5 hold.  However for some individuals in 
this regime, δ  may be sufficient reward for saving which would raise the discounted value of 














.  However this is 
not possible given capital market imperfections and so consumption would instead equal cash in 
hand and the consumer must be satisfied with a lower marginal utility ￿ hence the need for the 
minimum condition in 3.7.   
 
Assuming that a stationary solution exists to equation 3.7, this will define the optimal 
relationship between expenditure and wealth and prices, and can be written as  () , pcf w p = , 
for all wealth and price.  In that case, the marginal utility of real wealth  () , w Vw p can be 
denoted as  [ ] , qwp and assume the following properties of the functions hold 
   () () ,,
0; 0















∂  ∂∂  ≤∝
∂∂ ∂
;  
(3.8)   16  
i.e. the consumption policy function is increasing in wealth but decreasing in prices while the 
marginal utility of money is unambiguously decreasing in wealth but the effect of price depends 
on the slope of real marginal utility of consumption with respect to price.    Substituting 
() , / cf w pp =  for consumption gives the marginal utility of money as 








, and the policy function becomes  () [ ] () ,. . , f wp p p qwp λ
−1 = .  
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the solution to which will describe the marginal utility of money and therefore define the policy 
function.  For ease of notation denote the following functions 
[ ] () [ ] () 1 ,, , ( 1) ( 1) ( , , ( ) H qwp wp r q r w y p p qwp d F β λπ π








[ ] () [ ] () 2 ,, , ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( , , ( ) H qwp wp q w y p p qwp d F β δδ λ π π








where  [ ] () 1 ,, , H qwp wp and  [ ] () 2 ,, , H qwp wp are the discounted future value of savings 
and borrowings, respectively, for current wealth and price, w, p, and marginal utility of money 
[ ] , qwp. Extending the work of Deaton and Laroque (1992) and under a similar set of 
assumptions it is possible to show the following 
 
Theorem 1   17  
There is a unique stationary solution  [ ] , qwp, the solution to the functional equation 3.9, 
which is non-increasing and continuous in wealth.  In addition the solution can be 
characterised as follows 
 
[ ] , qwp= [ ] () 1 ,, , H qwp wp,  when   [ ] (1 ) 0, ( ) rq d F β ππ λ +≥ ∫P ; 
 
[ ] , qwp=λ ,    when 
[ ]
[]
(1 ) 0, ( ) ,  and














[ ] , qwp= [ ] () 2 ,, , H qwp wp, when 
[]
(1 ) (1 , ( ) ,  and














[ ] , qwp=λ ,    when (1 ) (1 , ( ) ; qd d F β δδ π π λ  +− + ) ≤  ∫P   
 
Proof available upon request. 
This theorem formalises the intuition given above: behaviour is determined by the value of 
wealth and optimal consumption today relative to valuation of future wealth, for any particular 
level of current wealth and prices, expectations and a constant set of preferences over 
consumption and wealth.  When the wealth level is sufficiently high that the real value of 
current marginal utility from consuming all of that wealth plus income is below the future 
marginal value of zero wealth, it is optimal given the individuals preferences to shift wealth 
toward the future, increasing current marginal utility and decreasing future marginal utility of 
wealth until a unique level of savings equates the two terms.  At a lower level of wealth, the 
individual will consume all cash on hand when it is optimal to carry zero assets between 
periods, given the cost of increasing current consumption and reducing future wealth δ , and 
decreasing current consumption while increasing future wealth, r.   When the value of carrying   18  
zero debt between periods is below the value of consuming all cash on hand, the individual will 
incur borrowings in order to decrease current marginal utility and increase future marginal 
utility but these borrowings will be below the maximum amount as long as the optimal 
consumption is below the point of the credit limit.  If wealth is sufficiently low that optimal 
consumption is above the sum of wealth, income and maximum credit, the individual will 
consume the maximum amount possible and would increase consumption if it were possible 
because the marginal value of future debt is below the marginal utility of consuming at the 
credit limit.   
 
The stationary equilibrium function  [ ] , qwp will be non-linear given the min condition 
resulting from the interest rate differential and the max condition resulting from the limit on 
borrowing. In addition the policy function which is recoverable by using 
() [ ] () ,. . , f wp p p qwp λ
−1 =  is non-differentiable at the three critical values of wealth levels 
where the solution switches between regimes:   
*
1 ww < ,    where   
*
1 (1 ) (1 ( ), ( ) qw y p c d F β δδ π π λ  +− + ) + − =  ∫P :              
                ()
*
1 , f wp w y d =+ +  
**
12 ww w <<  where   
*
2 (1 ) (1 ( ), ( ) qw y p c d F β δδ π π λ  +− + ) + − =  ∫P ; 
                 ()
**
12 , wy df w pwy ++< < + 
**
23 ww w << ,       where    
*
3 (1 ) (1 )( ), ( ) rq r wy p c d F β ππ λ  ++ + − =  ∫P ; 
                               ()
**
23 , wyf w pw y wy +< =+< + 
*
3 ww <                 where   
*
3 (1 ) (1 )( ), ( ) rq r wy p c d F β ππ λ  ++ + − =  ∫P ; 
                                ()
*
3 , wyf w pw y +< <+ 
At low levels of wealth, therefore, the solution tracks λ , follows an optimal path for wealth 
levels between 
*
1 w and 
*
2 w  where some positive borrowing incurs, follows λ  between
*
2 w  and   19  
*
3 w , and above 
*
3 w  again follows an optimal path with consumption less than cash on hand.  
Given  λ <  λ , the solution function  [ ] , qwp will be flatter than λ  while above λ  and 
between λ  and λ .     
 
4. Multi consumption periods within each payment period 
 
4.1 Model 
In this section the focus shifts to a model with a number of consumption periods, but where 
payment is received periodically.  There are three possible situations for the consumer: payment 
occurs in this period and not in the next period, payment does not occur this period or next 
period, and payment does not occur this period but does occur next period. Thus, a three period 
model is sufficient to capture the characteristics of the problem but any number of interim 
periods can be included. It seems natural to consider individual periods as weeks and each three 
period cycle as a month.  The value function for each week will reflect the proximity to receipt 
of income i.e. in week 1 it will reflect that income is received but that any debt will incur an 
interest cost in each week until the next payment, while behaviour in week 3 accounts for the 
receipt of income in following period and the immediate repayment of debt.  Combining this 
with the cost differential between savings and borrowings ensures that debt will never be 
incurred until all positive wealth is depleted.  We assume that the positive return on savings and 
the cost of borrowing are incurred each week, so the source of borrowing is more like an 
overdraft than a credit card.  The evolution of wealth between weeks follows the process 
  () 1 (1 ) ( ) ii i i i ww y p cr d r δ + =+ − + + − , where y=0 for i≠ 1. 
The maximisation problem therefore written as a Bellman equation for each week is: 
  () () ( ) { } 12
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  () () ( ) { } 31
0
,m a x ( 1 ) ( ) ( ,
pc w d
dd
Vw p u c V rwp c r d βδ π
≤+
≤≤
  =+ Ε + − + − )   P  
Income enters the budget constraint only in the first week and the maximum borrowing in each 
week is defined as total limit on ￿monthly￿ borrowing d , discounted by the cost of borrowing, 
δ , which is incurred weekly.  Therefore 
2
1 /(1 dd δ ≡+ ) ,  () 2 /1 ddδ ≡− + ,  3 dd ≡ , while the 
minimum wealth possible at the start of each week is given by  () 1 1 tt wd δ + ≡− + .  The first 
order conditions in 3.2 arise for each value function and so the real marginal utility of 




























   +  =( 1 + ) Ε    
  
  ++     
                                       (4.1) 
for  1 /(1 dd δ
2 =+ ) ,  2 /(1 dd δ =+ )  and  3 dd =  and where y=0 if i≠ 1. 
 
The interpretation of the Euler equation is similar to the simpler one period case from the 
previous section and again encompasses the four possible positions that the individual can be in 
for each week.   The individual will save and earn r when wealth is sufficiently high that the 
optimal consumption is below cash on hand, maximum utility involves substituting 
consumption towards future periods, and the Euler equation is fulfilled in an unconstrained way.  
Consumption will exactly equal cash on hand when the individual is neither sufficiently patient 
enough to save at r or impatient enough to borrow at δ .  An optimal consumption which 
involves saving at δ  i.e. decreasing consumption below cash in hand is unattainable, so the 







 when the optimal 
would be above that; hence the need for the minimum condition.  The Euler equation is also   21  
fulfilled without constraint in the third regime which involves an optimal level of borrowing at δ   
which is below the maximum level. Finally for any given level of wealth, the minimum 
attainable marginal utility is at the point of maximum borrowing is in the fourth regime and the 
solution will be at this point when all other consumption levels imply a lower unattainable 







, the marginal utility from the 
constrained level of consumption.   
 
Considering the behaviour over the payment cycle, an individual who consumes in regime 2 in 
the first week i.e. consumes all available wealth plus income, (or repays all debt out of income 
and consumes the remainder) must consume out of borrowing in the remaining weeks, i.e. must 
be in regime 3 or 4.  Similarly, an individual whose optimal consumption is very high relative to 
the real value of wealth and therefore chooses to be in regime 4 with maximum possible 
borrowing, will have zero or negative consumption in the following weeks until the next income 
is received.  However this is unlikely to be a solution once there are restrictions placed on 
preferences to allow only strictly positive consumption levels.   
 
The stationary solution to equation 4.1, will define the consumption function relationship 
between wealth, prices and expenditure in each week.  Using the same notation as Section 3, 
denote  () , ii pcf w p = ,for i = 1,2,3, for all wealth and prices.  Denote the marginal utility of 
real wealth as  [ ] , i qw p  and we assume the optimal policy function is increasing in wealth but 
decreasing in prices while the marginal utility of money is decreasing in wealth but the price 
effects depend on the slope of real marginal utility of consumption (as in 3.8).  Substituting 
() , / i cf w pp =  for consumption gives the marginal utility of money as 
[ ] , i qw p = ()
11






, and the policy function becomes 
() [ ] () ,. . , ii f wp p p q wp λ
−1 = .  Writing the Euler equation 4.1 in terms of the marginal utility   22  
of money, gives the following functional equation to which there is a unique solution  [ ] , i qw p  
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The functions  [ ] () 1 ,, , i Hqw pw p ,  [ ] () 2 ,, , i Hq w pw p ,λ  , λ , have analogous definitions to 
Section 3 i.e. where  [ ] () 1 ,, , i Hqw pw p  and  [ ] () 2 ,, , i Hq w pw p  are the discounted future 
value of savings and borrowings, respectively, for wealth today w, price today p, and marginal 
utility of money  [ ] , i qw p  in week i.  Following the analysis in Bailey and Chambers (1996), 
who grouped time spells together into epochs in the analysis of season harvest prices, we can 
develop a similar proof in order to state the following 
 
Theorem 2: 
There is a unique set of functions  [ ] , i qw p , the stationary solutions to the functional equations 
(4.2) above, which are non-increasing and continuous in wealth.  In addition the solutions can 
be characterised as follows 
[ ] , i qw p = [ ] () 11 ,, , i Hq w pw p + ,   when   [ ] 1 (1 ) 0, ( ) i rq d F β ππ λ + +≥ ∫P ; 
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[ ] , i qw p = λ      w h e n   1 (1 ) (1 , ( ) ii qd d F β δδ π π λ +  +− + ) ≤  ∫P . 
 
Proof available upon request. 
 
The theorem sets out the conditions for each regime: positive saving is optimal when the wealth 
level is sufficiently high that the real marginal utility from consuming all cash on hand, λ , is 
below the discounted future real value of the marginal utility of money from zero savings.  In 
this case, consumption is shifted towards the future so that current marginal utility increases and 
future marginal utility of money decreases until a unique level of saving is reached that results 
in equality between the two terms.  When the wealth level is such that the real marginal utility 
from consuming cash on hand is above the discounted marginal utility of zero savings in the 
following week discounted at r, the individual has an incentive to increase consumption and 
carry negative wealth into the next week.  However, the cost δ  of borrowing may bring the 
discounted future marginal utility of zero borrowing above the marginal utility of cash on hand 
in which case the preference for higher consumption is not strong enough that the individual is 
willing to borrow at δ .  When wealth is lower however, it is optimal for the individual to have a 
positive level of debt below the limit which decreases current marginal utility of consumption 
while increasing the future marginal utility of wealth.  Borrowing is below the limit provided 
the marginal utility from maximum negative wealth in the following week is above the marginal 
utility of maximum consumption today.  Finally an individual consumes at maximum debt when 
optimal consumption is so high relative to the real value of wealth, that even at maximum debt 
the individual would further decrease current marginal utility of consumption by borrowing if it 
were possible.   
 









 for  1 ρ > , 
where  ρ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the simulated numerical solution is 
shown in Figure 2 for a CRRA utility function where we assume β   = 0.95, and ρ  = 2.5.  The 
cost of borrowing δ , is set equal to 0.4% giving an annualised rate of 25% which is   24  
representative of the rates applicable on very short-term borrowing.  Standard numerical 
methods of dynamic programming as outlined in Deaton (1991,1992) are used to reach the 
solution. 
 




The u-shape is evident at all levels of wealth: consumption is highest in the week when income 
is received, lowest in the next week  and the increasing over the remaining weeks.  The model 
replicates almost perfectly the pattern in the data in Figure 1.  Hence the FES data is the clearly 
the outcome of optimal behaviour once we allow for precautionary motives and limits on 
borrowing for the type of expenditure considered here.  This is despite the relatively simple 
utility function used in the simulation of the model.  The kinks at the points where the solution 
switches between different regimes are clearly evident in week four and so for any given wealth 
level is this week we can predict perfectly the regime within which the individual will be and 
hence their borrowing/saving behaviour.  The solution also shows that week four is the only 
week for which regime four can occur and again this is consistent with the infinite cost of zero 
consumption in the utility function that we have assumed.   
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5.   Empirical Estimation 
 
The Family Expenditure Survey (FES) in the UK provides expenditure patterns for two 
consecutive weeks for each individual in the survey and also records the dates over which this 
expenditure is recorded, and the level of and timing of the receipt of regular labour income.  The 
sample of interest for the estimation of our model is those individuals who are in paid 
employment and receive income on a monthly basis, and from the data we can calculate at 
which point in their payment cycle each individual is observed.  The model however, is one of 
non-durable consumption and so income should be interpreted as a measure of disposable 
income, i.e. after regular payments such as housing and heating costs, credit repayments etc. are 
made.
8  The FES gives very detailed information regarding loans and higher purchase schemes 
outstanding for all individuals but records housing and heating costs at a household level only.  
Therefore we include only single individuals who are heads of households, about three fifths of 
whom are homeowners and we can then deduct regular costs from monthly labour income to 
give a measure of disposable income available for non-durable consumption.  This also allows 
us to use the household level indicator of credit card ownership rather than the individual 
variable as an indicator of possible liquidity constraints
9 and abstracts from the issue of resource 
pooling in households who receive income at different points in time.  The data on these 
individuals are pooled for three years of the FES 1996-99 giving a total of 727 observations.    
 
The first panel in Table 1 provides some summary statistics according to ownership of a credit 
card.  There is a clear income effect in credit card possession with higher monthly income and 
living costs for card holders but still have higher disposable income.  The second panel of Table 
1 shows the mean of weekly expenditure as a proportion of monthly disposable income for each 
week in the cycle.  The range of expenditure share is very large and it would seem difficult for 
any model to reconcile individuals who spend less than 0.05% of their disposable income in 
week one (twenty observations) with those who spend more than their whole monthly 
disposable income (seven observations) in week one.  In addition our model predicts that 
expenditure in the first week should never be less than 0.20 of disposable income even at 
minimum wealth levels and for the worst price draw (see Figure 2) although in fact there are 
208 observations in the data for which this is not true.    Examining the means in each week 
                                                           
8 In the model, wealth should also be interpreted as liquid cash on hand rather than (illiquid) saving or 
investments for long-term purposes, and income refers to disposable income. 
 
9 The recording of individual credit card ownership relies on the individual recalling paying an annual 
charge for their card but card possession at a household level is recorded irrespective of charges.  In this 
sample only 60% hold a credit card when using the individual level question, while 71% do using the 
household question, which seems more accurate given the choice of sample i.e. single salaried 
employees.     26  
reveals that the u-shape pattern over the month which is evident for the whole dataset and is 
predicted by the model is also clearly evident for this sub sample of individuals although for 




   Credit Card holders:  N=516    Non Credit Card holders:  N=211
  Mean  Std Dev    Mean  Std Dev 
Age 34.7  9.4   33.4  9.7 
Monthly Income  1277.27  659.58   893.76  408.57 
Housing Cost  378.04  261.58   282.98  170.79 
Electricity 39.39  28.62   29.93  26.85 
Credit Repayments  62.44  94.88   43.35  77.49 
Disposable Income  764.44  535.05   553.21  367.81 
 
Weekly expenditure as a share of monthly  disposable income 
  Credit Card holders  Non Credit Card holders 
  N  Mean  Std Dev  Min Max  N  Mean  Std Dev  Min Max 
Week 1
10 249  0.23  0.21  0.02 2.72  94  0.23  0.33  0.02 2.71 
Week 2  263  0.21  0.21  0.02 2.63  111  0.30  0.38  0.01 2.06 
Week 3  266  0.24  0.24  0.01 1.70  117  0.25  0.33  0.01 2.38 






5.1  Estimation procedure     
 
The simulated policy function show in Figure 2 is calculated over an equally spaced grid of 
points of W possible values for wealth and H possible values for price.  Therefore the numerical 
solution to the policy function is a W x H table of values each corresponding to a particular 
combination of wealth and price.  This solution allows us to relate any level of wealth and price 
to the optimal consumption by linear interpolation between those grid points.  Thus for any 
given wealth, price, and parameter vector θ , we can calculate the optimal outcome as   27  
() ,; tt t t t pc f w p θ = .  We can then estimate the parameters which most closely match the 
observed expenditure level to that implied by this non-linear policy function.  However, in the 
data neither wealth nor price data are available and so the estimation instead relies on the 
relationship between expenditure in adjacent weeks.  In short, we take expenditure in week t and 
by inverting the policy function for week t we can find for any given price, the level of wealth 
combination consistent with that expenditure observation, i.e. observed expenditure will give an 
implied level of cash on hand  ()
1 ;, tt t t t wfp c p θ
− = .  The success of this relies upon the 
monotonicity of the function if there is to be a unique association between an expenditure 
observation and wealth level.  In addition, the concavity of the consumption function means that 
the solution points for expenditure for the wealth and price points on the grid are not equally 
spaced.  However, the use of linear interpolation ensures that neither of these issues is a problem 
although it does require relatively large values for W and P.  Once the implied wealth level  t w  
is calculated, the cash on hand carried into the next period  t+1 can be calculated using the 
equation for the evolution of wealth:  ()
1
1 (1 )( ; , ) tt t t t t t w f pc p y pc ζθ
−
+ =+ +−  where y=0 if 
t≠ 1, ζ δ =  if () tt t wp c − < 0, and  r ζ =  otherwise.  Conditional on expenditure in t and price 
outcomes in t and t+1, 1 , tt p π +  respectively, expenditure in t+1 can therefore be calculated as  
() ( ) ( ) () ()
1
11 1 1 1 1 ;, ,, 1 ; , ,;, t t tt t t t t tt t tt t t pc p cp f f p cp y p c πθ ζ θπ π θ
−
++ + + + + =+ + − ,  
and by taking an expectation over the price distribution in the second period, we can arrive at an 
expectation of expenditure for the second week of observation conditional upon the observed 
level of expenditure in the first week, the price outcome in the first week and the parameter 
vector which is given by 
() ( ) ( ) () () ( ) 11
1
11 1 1 ;, , 1 ; , ,; ;,
tt tt t tt t t t tt t t t t tt E p c pc p E f f pc p y pc pc p ππ θζ θ π θ
++
−
++ + + =+ + −
 However the implied level of cash on hand  ()
1 ;, tt t t t wfp c p θ
− =  must be calculated for all 
possible first period prices  t p .  Therefore taking an expectation again over the price distribution 
gives the first conditional moment of the second period expenditure as  
() ( )
1 11 ;; ,
tt tt p t t tt mp c E E pc p c π θθ
+ ++  =         
           ()( ) () () ( ) 1
1
11 1; , , ; ;




 =+ + −  
. 
The second moment consists of the expectation of variance of expenditure 
11 1 ;, ,, tt t ttt pc p cp πθ ++ +  around each conditional mean  ()
1 11 ;, ,
t tt t tt Ep c p c p π θ
+ ++ , this being 
 
10 The calculation for Week 1 omits an observation for which the reported expenditure is 26 times 
income: this observation distorted the mean and standard deviation   28  
due to the uncertainty of prices in t+1, plus the expected variance around each mean conditional 




11 1 11 ; ; ,, , ; ,,
t tt t t tt t t t t tt t vp c E pc p cp E pc p cp
τ ππ θπ θ θ




11 11 ;, ;
tt t pt t t t t t E E pc p c E E pc ππ π θθ
++ ++ ++    +−    . 
The second extra terms is due to the fact that first period price is not observed to the 
econometrician.    
 
Estimation is carried out using the pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (PMLE) of 
Gourieroux et al, (1984).  The general methodology used is therefore very similar to that used 
by Deaton and Laroque (1995,1996) which estimated a model of commodity prices where the 
policy function is also dependant on two unobservable variables.  The log of the PMLE written 
as a function of the K-vector of parameters θ  and  j=1￿..N observations in the dataset 
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The variance covariance matrix for the PMLE is calculated as  
()
11 ’ VJG G J
−− =             ( 5 . 2 )  
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The relationship between wealth and expenditure has been shown to be non-linear with kinks 
existing at the points where the solution switches between the four regimes, Therefore the 
likelihood will be non-differentiable with respect to the parameters at these points, but as shown 
in Laroque and Salanie (1994), a PMLE will result in consistent estimates of the parameters 
despite the non-differentiability.  However, the non-differentiability leads to substantial 
difficulties in relying on numerical derivatives in the maximisation procedure and so we use 
alternative maximisation methods in the estimation.   
 
Throughout the analysis we assume that the price distribution is the same in all periods and that 
draws from that distribution are iid.  To simplify the calculations we consider H discrete values 
from F and these discrete values are naturally the grid points used in the numerical solution.    29  
Thus we avoid numerical integration in calculating the expectations over price
11.  Equation 6.3 
shows the calculation of the conditional expectation and variance of second period expenditure 
under these assumptions, for h=1,￿￿H draws of price in period t denoted by t p , in t+1, 
denoted by  1 t π + .  The expectations are now calculated as simply weighted averages of the 
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These conditional moments are then substituted into (5.1) to give the PMLE. 
 
We carry out a small Monte Carlo study to investigate the properties of the PMLE in this 
framework using the same parameters values as previously: β   = 0.95, ρ  = 2.5, δ  = 0.4%  and r = 
0.  The parameter vector in the estimation procedure could include  , rd βρδ ,,,  and possibly 
the parameters of the price distribution also, but we do not try to identify all those parameters 
from the data and instead restrict the estimation to the coefficient of risk aversion ρ .  The 
replications are carried out for three values of ρ : (1.5, 2.5, 5), and for two different price 
distributions (normal and uniform).  In the case of the uniform distribution, prices can take on 
any of six equally spaced discrete values between 0.75 and 1.25, for which the expectation is 
one.  We use a normal distribution N(1,0.17
2) so that it has the same support as the uniform 
distribution but twice the variance.  This is discretised by six points, each point being the mid-
points of the interval within which 1/6 of the density lies. (See Deaton and Laroque, 1996).  For 
each of these scenarios we draw 100 datasets of either 500 or 1000 observations.  When 
estimating just one parameter, we use a simple golden-section procedure to find the maximum 
and find this very fast and reliable.  The results are presented below. 
 
The empirical distribution of the estimator is very close to the asymptotic variance given by 
(5.2) and in all cases the estimated parameter is within two standard deviations of the true value.  
                                                           
11 Therefore it is possible that F is a discrete distribution or is a continuous distribution approximated   30  
These results suggest that there are no obvious problems within the estimation procedure and all 
the maxima are robust to changing the starting values.   
 
Table 2    
Monte Carlo results 
 
Uniform Distribution of Prices 
ρ   1.5  2.5   5 
Sample Size 
 
500 1000    500 1000    500 1000 
Mean Estimate 
 
1.5025 1.5030  2.5088 2.5053  4.9637 5.1430 
Sample SE  0.0199 0.0138   0.1022 0.0733   0.2170  0.1552 
Asymptotic SE  0.0189 0.0134   0.0984 0.0692   0.2473  0.1359 
 
 
Normal Distribution of Prices 
ρ   1.5  2.5   5 
Sample Size 
 
500 1000    500 1000    500 1000 
Mean Estimate 
 
1.4746 1.5032  2.4956 2.5108  5.0861  4.985 
Sample SE  0.0141  0.0150   0.0876 0.0758   0.1477  0.1981
Asymptotic SE    0.0134  0.0144   0.0734 0.0756   0.1253  0.1756
 
 
The simulated dataset gives us an idea of what we should expect to see in the actual dataset if it 
is to be described by our model.  Some problems were identified earlier in this section when we 
found very small and very large observations and observations below the minimum predicted by 
the model.  However comparison of the simulated and actual datasets shows that the change in 
expenditure between weeks is very large in the actual data relative to what the model predicts in 
the simulated dataset.  This is because for large ranges of wealth, the conditional expectation 
given in 5.3 can be closely approximated by a straight line with a slope less than one.  Figure 3a 
shows a histogram of the proportional change in expenditures between weeks two and three 
from a simulated dataset.  The mean is close to 0.05% with variance of 0.126.  This is in sharp 
contrast to the same histogram for the actual dataset from the FES where although the mean 
 
using a method of quadrature.   31  
change is 16% the variance is 0.838, giving rise to the large swings evident in the data.  This 
arises either because the variance in prices in the actual dataset if far larger than we allow for or 
alternatively there is substantial measurement error in the data.  In addition, a simple linear 
regression of expenditure in t+1 on t gives a coefficient close to 0.75 in the simulated dataset,  
while in the actual data the coefficient is closer to 0.35.  This is symptomatic of the attenuation 
bias resulting from classical measurement error and so we extend the estimation procedure to 
take account of that. 
 
As a crude attempt to examine the robustness of the model we select a subsample of data which 
omits observations which have expenditure as a proportion of income greater than 0.8 in any 
week, less than 0.2 in week and have changes in expenditure between the two weeks greater 
than 100%.  This leaves 377 data points and results of applyin the estimation method above are 
presented in Table 3 for different assumptions for the limit on borrowing as a proportion of 




Results of Estimation 
 
   Uniform  Distribution   Normal  Distribution 
d   
 
0.33     0.66  0.9  0.33  0.66  0.9 
ρ   3.9694  4.1774  3.8869 4.3827 4.666  4.3281 




Figure 3a  Simulated data: proportional change in expenditure between second and third week   32  
 
 
















While we do emphasize that these results are not definitive, they give an indication of how 
robust the model is.  Estimates of the coefficient of risk aversion close to 4 are well within those 
found previously in the literature and this is very reassuring.  We believe that once measurement 
error in the data is taken account of, the estimates will be very robust. 
 
5.2      Measurement Error 
 
If we assume that classical measurement error exists in the data, then the observed expenditure 
is the sum of true expenditure plus noise i.e.  ! *
tt tt t pc pc ε =+  such that ()
*,0 tt Ep c τ ε = .  
Therefore the conditional expectation of interest is now 
   ! () ! ! () 1 11 , ;;
t t tt t t tt p pc p c pc mE E π θθ
+ ++ 
 =    33  
and the variance 
   ! () ! ! () () ! () ( ) 1
2
11 ;; , ;
tt tt p t t tt tt vp c E E pc p c mp c π θθ θ
+ ++
 =−  
. 
Thus the parameters are estimated by minimising the distance between the observed (noisy) 
expenditure  in t+1 and the expectation of expenditure  in t+1 period based on a contaminated 
observation in t.  However, the methodology outlined above relates true expenditure 
observations in different weeks.  Nevertheless if we assume a joint normal distribution between 
the contaminated observation and the error itself, then the expectation can still be calculated.  
Assume that the joint distribution is 
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and thus the conditional distribution of the error given a noisy observation is 
 
















−   ++ 
. 
For any observation and a corresponding value of  | tt t p c ε ,  !! () tt tt pc pc ε −|  gives the ￿true￿ 
observation and so the procedure outlined in 5.1 can be used to calculate the conditional 
expectation as 
   !! () !! () ! () , |, | ;; tt tt tt tt tt pc pc pc pc pc mm εε ε θθ −| =  
This can however be integrated over the conditional distribution of  t ε  and therefore the 
conditional expectation allowing for the measurement error becomes 
   ! () ! !! () () | ;;
tt t tt tt tt pc pc pc pc mE m ε ε θθ −| =  
and similarly the variance can be written as 
   () ! ! () () ! ()
2 2
,1 1 ;; , ;
t tt tt t t tt tt pc vp c E E pc p c mp c
τ ππ ε θε θ σ θ
+1
2
++ | =| + − . 
Thus the first and second moments conditional on observed expenditure can be calculated 
provided an expectation is also taken over the conditional distribution of  t ε .  We use Gauss-
Hermite quadrature to approximate the conditional distribution of  t ε .  The parameter vector 
now consists of the risk aversion parameter ρ  and the variance of the measurement error σ
2.   
   34  
The difference between the conditional expectation with and without measurement error is 
shown in Figure 4 where the variance of the measurement error is assumed to be 0.1.  Clearly 
this is significant.  Again a Monte Carlo study was carried out to investigate the performance of 
the estimator and the (preliminary and incomplete) results are given in Table 4.   
 
Table 4    
Monte Carlo results 
Uniform Distribution of Prices 
ρ   1.5   2.5 
σ   0.01 0.05    0.01  0.1 
Sample Size 
 
1000 1000    1000  1000 
ρ           
Mean Estimate  1.52205 1.4999   2.6561  2.7354 
Sample SE  0.0357        0.1184   
Asymptotic SE  0.0559      0.202   
σ           
Mean Estimate  0.0098 0.0501  0.0092  0.0973 
Sample SE  0.0038  0.0018    0.0090  0.0042 
Asymptotic SE  0.0049  0.0033    0.0148  0.0040 
 
These results are very encouraging: except for the first estimate of ρ =2 . 5, all of the estimates 
are within a standard error of the true values.  The discrepancy between the sample and 
asymptotic standard error warrants further investigation.  However, we offer two possible 
explanations for this.  Firstly, we have only 100 replications in each case and while this was 
sufficient in the simpler case which ignored measurement error, this may not be the case here 
and so a larger number of replications may solve the problem.  In addition, given the non-
differentiabilities in the likelihood, the calculation of the asymptotic variance-covariance is 
relies on numerical derivatives and is sensitive to the step size used in the calculations and so it 
may be that at each maximum a different step size would lead to a different value for the 
asymptotic standard error.  Clearly these results are incomplete and we intend to extend the 
Monte Carlo to other values for the parameters etc.   
 
When applying these estimation techniques to the actual data to hand, we chose to firstly to 
reparameterise the model.  This ensures that the values of ρ  do not go towards one because the 
calculation of the numerical solution then breaks down.  Also the estimated standard deviation   35  
of the measurement error must be positive and less than the value for the standard deviation of 
the observed expenditure  ! ()
22
tt tt pc pc σσ σ
2 + = and so for this reason we re-parameterised the 
model so that the estimated parameter vector θ  is defined by  
  () () () /1 exp ρρ ρρ θ 1 =+ − + −  
  () ( ) () 2 /1 exp σσ σσ θ =+ − + −  
such that  [ ] , 1.5,11 ρρ  =   and =[] !
2 ,1 0 5 ,
tt pc e σ σσ   =−   .   Preliminary results for these 
estimations are shown in Table 5.  We assume that the borrowing limit is set to 90% of 
disposable income and that prices are normally distributed N(1, 0.1225).  We exclude all 
observations where the proportion of expenditure is greater than total disposable income in any 
one week (29 observations).  These observations triple the standard deviation of the data while 
increasing the mean of expenditure by 0.06.  In the first column of Table 6 we also excluded 
observations for which expenditure in week 1 is less than 10% of disposable income (59).  The 
last row of the table shows the standard deviation of the expenditure data which we condition on 
and so from the estimates for σ  above, we see that measurement error accounts for close to 
50% of it.  These results are very preliminary and further estimation is ongoing. 
 
Table 5 
Results of Estimation 
   
Price Distribution  N(1,0.122)  N(1,0.122)  N(1,0.04)  N(1,0.01) 
N  594  653 653 653 
mean 
loglikelihood 
2.92411 2.90767  2.8158 2.75589 
 
ρ   6.89213 10.305 6.5503 7.098 
Asymptotic  SE       
σ   0.07143 0.07768  0.1083 0.1177 
Asymptotic  SE       
       
!
2















In this paper, we have used the basic prediction of consumption theory: that consumers will 
make the discounted utility value of expenditure equal in every period, to characterise behaviour 
in a general framework.  We can exactly predict consumer behaviour when there are market 
imperfections with respect to the quantity available and price of credit and when there is 
uncertainty with respect to expenditure levels.  The model examined proposed is one of optimal 
consumer behaviour of an individual who makes consumption decisions over the short-run 
when there are credit market constraints and when income is received either at the same time as 
when consumption decisions are made, or when there is periodic receipt of income.  We arrive 
at the stationary solution following Deaton and Laroque, (1992) and Bailey and Chambers, 
(1996), and that solution allows us to characterise the behaviour of any consumer for given 
interest rates, discount rate, real wealth level and set of expectations.  The solution suggests that 
individuals are prudent when they face a large amount of uncertainty but as the uncertainty is 
revealed over time, they increase consumption.  The pattern of consumption observed in the   37  
data is consistent with the predictions of the model for even a relatively simple utility function. 
However, we believe that measurement error is a significant problem in the data and allow the 
estimation to take account of this.  The effect on the first conditional moment of the model is 
significant and preliminary estimates suggest that measurement error accounts for about 50% of 
the standard deviation in the data.  Our estimated values of  ρ  are quite large but further 
estimation is ongoing. 
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